CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION
THROUGH THE ASSERTION OF
PRIVATE RIGHTS
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER*

Air pollution is clearly one of the major social problems confronting contemporary American society. Yet the United States is still
without an effective federal pollution control program, and those
state and local control programs that do exist are largely ineffective. Until government regulation is able to keep the expulsion of air contaminants within tolerable limits, it will be
necessary for those seeking to control air pollution to rely upon
the assertion of private rights. In this article the author discusses
the principal causes of action available to the private pollution
controller, and concludes that, although traditional legal concepts may provide the framework for obtaining adequate relief in
individual cases, the overall pollution control consequences of
private actions are at best piecemeal and not a substitute for
effective government regulation.
HE air corridors above the United States have been so polluted
in our short history as an industrial nation that by 1960 nearly
one-fourth of the American population lived in cities suffering major
air pollution problems." The serious plight of these citizens is
revealed by the statistical conclusion that their chance of dying
from respiratory ailments between 50 and 70 years of age is double
that of fellow citizens living in relatively non-polluted areas. 2 In
addition to damage to health, the damage caused by air pollution
to property in the United States probably exceeds eleven billion
dollars each year, or approximately $65 per American citizen.3
The magnitude of the problem would seem to clearly necessitate
governmental action. Yet in 1967, the nation is still without an
effective federal control program, and state and local control proT
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grams are with very few exceptions non-existent, ineffective, or poorly
4

enforced.

The purpose of this article is to suggest that until governmental
action is effective to keep the expulsion of air pollutants within
tolerable limits, there are private rights which may under some circumstances be asserted by individuals to protect themselves from or
obtain redress for injuries to their health and damage to their property. Assertions of private rights have control consequences 5 in
' U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, A DIGEST OF STATE AnR POLLU-

(Public Health Service Pub. No. 711, 1966 ed. [hereinafter cited as HEW
DIGEST], shows that 26 states provided legislative controls over air pollution as of 1966.
In general, the acts define air pollution as "the presence in the outdoor atmosphere
of one or more air contaminants in sufficient quantities and of such characteristics and
duration as to be injurious to human, plant, or animal life or to property ...." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6202 (a). Violation of the air polution regulations is usually punishable by fine. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-803 (1961); Ky. REv. STAT. § 77.255 (1962).
However, Florida allows injunction proceedings to be initiated in the case of noncompliance, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.18 (Supp. 1966), and the maintenance of a nuisance
in Iowa is punishable by fine, imprisonment not to exceed one year, and/or abatement
of the nuisance, IowA CODE ANN. § 657.3 (1950). Certain of the acts provide for tax
exemptions or rapid amortization of air pollution control devices. CAL. REv. & TAX.
CODE §§ 17226, 24372 (West 1956); MICH. CoMP. LAWs §§ 336.1-.8 (1967); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 149:5-a (1964).
Other acts, such as those of Minnesota and Mississippi,
merely authorize municipalities to enact air pollution regulations. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 461.07-.08 (1963), 144.12 (14) (Supp. 1966); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 3374-124, -150 (1956).
Most of the acts provide some method for obtaining variances or relief from strict application. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 23-25-15 (a) to (c) (Supp. 1956); TExAs REv. CIv.
STAT. art. 4477-4 (Supp. 1966).
The most glaring deficiency to be seen in a review of state air pollution control
regulations is the lack of any consideration of the interstate implications of air pollution emissions. The Clean Air Act §§ 102-04, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a-c (1964), attempted to
alleviate this problem by encouraging the establishment of interstate cooperation in
research and technical assistance through the use of federal grants. However, the
present federal legislation contains no effective prohibition controls. Section 105 of
the Act, which provides for the abatement of air pollution, is permissive in nature
and may only be utilized upon the request of a state governor. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d
(1964).
The Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, was signed by President Johnson
on November 21, 1967. Its operation is modeled on the Water Quality Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 466 (1964), and gives the states specified time limits within which they must adopt air
quality standards, § 108 (c), after issuance of air quality criteria by the Secretary of
HEW, § 107 (b), subject to judicial proceedings in a federal court in the case of failure
to enact or enforce such standards, § 108 (g). However, the major amendment to the
Air Quality Act which was sought in the original Senate bill, S. 780, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967), which would have established national uniform emission standards for
specific pollutants, was deleted from both the Senate and House versions because of
strong opposition from various industry groups including coal and steel producers and
electric power companies. 25 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPORT 1287 (1967). The bill, as
passed, does not, therefore, provide the solution which is necessary, but the additional
enforcement powers which have been given to the Secretary of HEW are an improvement.
5"There are many legal paths to the goal of the elimination of air pollution in this
TION LAWS ii
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that they lead to injunctions against future pollution or in that
damages obtained from polluters make the expulsion of pollutants
expensive and thereby economically motivate polluters to control
pollution.6
The approach taken in this article is to examine the causes of
action which may be used by the would-be pollution controller.
Three principal theories of action can be distinguished upon which
the individual may ground his assertion of private rights: (1) nuisance and (2) trespass, which are generally used in connection with
damage to property, and (3) negligence, which is primarily used in
connection with injury to person. A fourth theory-strict liability7
will also be discussed.
country. One method-widely overlooked by the bar-is the bringing of a civil action

against the polluters for lung damage or other injury caused by the inhalation of the
polluting substance." Rheingold, Lawsuit as Social Action?, 2 TRIAL, Oct.-Nov., 1966,
at 11.
Others have been less optimistic when considering private rights and air pollution
control and have rejected the concept as having no important control potential: "While
air pollution, particularly smoke, was not a nuisance per se at common law, evidence
in each particular case could show that it was in fact a nuisance. Despite this abstract
protection of the common law against air pollution, private litigation for relief
from the effects of such pollution has been unsuccessful as a means of control. The
remedy of injunction is so drastic as to limit its use to extreme cases, and the collection
of damages where a plaintiff is successful is often merely a recurrent fee that the
defendant is willing to pay. The failure of individual action as an answer to the
problem is not at all surprising in the face of the following facts of legal life: (a) The
suffering of any given individual has often been neither significant nor irreparable,
nor readily enough demonstrable in terms of dollars of damage to satisfy the doctrines
that limit the granting of effectively deterrent kinds of relief; (b) The difficulty and
cost of investigating and of properly proving, from among all possible sources, the
source, or sources responsible for a given injury have been too far out of proportion
to the likely benefits of successful litigation; (c) In an urban setting, pollution may stem
from innumerable sources, many of which, although contributing to the harm complained of, constitute no readily identifiable source of injury." Rogers & Edelman, Air
Pollution Control Legislation, 2 AnR POLLUTION 428, 450-31 (A. Stern ed. 1962).
8
This is similar to the argument made by many economists when they suggest that
pollution be controlled by taxing it. The taxation approach seems particularly wellsuited to water pollution because the tax money can be used to purify the water and
the amount of the tax can be determined by the cost of correcting the pollution.
Where air pollution is concerned, however, the problem is not so simple since there
is at present no effective way of cleansing the air once it is polluted. Thus, the
primary relation of a tax on air pollution to the economic consequences of the pollution would be to the damage it causes. See Mills, Economic Incentives in Air Pollution Control, in THE EcoNoMIcs OF AIR POLLUON 40 (H. Wolozin ed. 1966).
7 Rheingold lists as "causes of action" for personal injury due to air pollution:
(1)occupier adjacent to factory, (2) premises liability, (3)person off premises, (4)
contractors; maintenance companies, (5) gas dealers, (6) products liability, (7) motor
vehicles, (8) occupational diseases and other statutes, (9) action by urban residents,
(10) action against government, (11) products liability action against automobile manufacturers, and (12) medical malpractice. Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung
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Damage Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 17, 24-30
(1966). It would seem that this is not a classification by "causes of action" but by
potential plaintiffs and/or potential defendants.
As Rheingold's discussion itself reveals, these plaintiffs will choose to ground their
theory in negligence, trespass, and/or nuisance in most instances. Id. Rheingold's
discussion does suggest two additional causes or theories of action-as those terms are
used in this article-namely, statutory liability and products liability. Id. at 26, 28-30.
For a discussion of the former see note 87 infra and accompanying text. As for the
latter, the expanding field of products liability presents a specie of cause of action
which, although part of the general field of tort and contract actions, represents a
hybrid cause with unique attributes. A thorough discussion of the elements of a
products liablity case is beyond the scope of this article. For a general treatment see
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 28.12-.14 (1956).
It is important to note, for the purposes of this article, that the characterization
of a products liability action as one based on express or implied warranty, fitness for
the particular purposes of the buyer and merchantable quality, carries with it the
problems of basing an action ex contractu. In such an instance the limitations on the
cause of action would differ from one based in tort. Privity of contract might well
become a necessary basis of the action, and the recoverable damages would differ from
those in a tort action. See, e.g., F.H. Woodruff & Sons v. Brown, 256 F.2d 391 (5th
Cir. 1958); Stanley v. Chastek, 34 I1. App. 2d 220, 180 N.E.2d 512 (1962); W. PROSSER,
It is apparent in the
LAW OF TORTS § 93 (3d ed. 1964) fhereinafter cited as PROSSER].
cases collected that there is no clear authority as to the applicability of contract or tort
limitations in products liability actions. The plaintiff in an air pollution suit should
be well aware of this problem before choosing a possible attack which offers no alternative grounds of recovery.
The developing area of products liability which offers the pollution controller an
enhanced method of attack is the concept of strict liability. See generally F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, supra at §§ 28.15-.28; PROSSER § 97. The major difference in this concept
is that, once having established the defendant's relationship to the product, the defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product, and the existence of a
proximate causal connection between such condition and the plaintiff's injuries or
damages, there is no necessity to prove negligence on the part of the defendant.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962). This position has been accepted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402 (A) (1965), which provides:
"(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the
seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to
and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller
has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b)
the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller."
Extensions of the strict liability rule have been made into almost every area of
possible products liability on the part of manufacturers and sellers. See Chapman
Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949) (crop damage caused by a
chemical spray manufactured by the defendant and utilized by another party). The
use of this theory as a basis of air pollution control through suits against manufacturers and sellers of offending products may well prove to be a major means of successful control. See Emroch, Pleading and Proof in a Strict Products Liability Case, 525
INS. L.J. 581 (1966). Again the problems of the statute of limitations, types of recoverable damages, burden of proof, and, in some cases, choice of laws, indemnification, and
contribution must be emphasized as being of prime consideration in choosing the type
of action. See, e.g., George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
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NUISANCE

Air pollution was labeled a nuisance at least as early as 1611 when
an English court affirmed the granting of an injunction and damages in William Aldred's Cases on a showing that the plaintiff's air
had been corrupted by defendant's hog sty. The defendant was
found to be committing a nuisance even though he pleaded that
the building of a house for hogs was necessary for the sustenance of
man and that one ought not to have so delicate a nose that he cannot
bear the smell of hogs. The court reached its decision for plaintiff
by reasoning that since the law gave an action for light and air, "a
fortiori an action lies in the case at Bar for infecting and corrupting
the air."0
Since at common law the gravamen of an action for nuisance lay
in the interference with a right to use property, we can conclude
from William Aldred's Case that a property owner has a right to
have the air above his property free from infection and corruption.
However, when a court is called upon to protect this right it finds
itself wielding a two-edged sword, namely, the right of both parties
to use their property as they wish-subject only to an identical right
in the other party. As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has said,
the law of private nuisance is "a definition of the dividing line
between the right of any owner to use his property as he so desires
and the recognition of that right in another."' 1
Since our nation has until recently been unable to comprehend
that any of its resources-much less pure air-are exhaustible, and
since even today the full impact of the effects, causes, and control of
air pollution is poorly understood by most lawyers and judges as well
as laymen, it is not surprising to discover that an individual is
confronted with serious obstacles when he asserts his right to be free
from air pollution through a nuisance action. An examination of
the leading cases in which air pollution was alleged to constitute a
379 U.S. 904 (1964); Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. IIl.
1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
An infrequently used additional cause of action which is available to the victim
of air pollution is a suit in inverse condemnation where the plaintiff's property has
been invaded by pollution emanating from the activities of a state, municipality, or
even a private corporation having the power of eminent domain, and plaintiff has not
received just compensation. See, e.g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233
U.S. 546 (1914); Donaldson v. Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808 (1942).
877 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611).
9
Id. at 821.
10 Roberts v. C.F. Adams & Son, 199 Okla. 369, 371, 184 P.2d 634, 637 (1947).
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nuisance leads to the conclusion that the courts, while paying lip
service to the landowner's right to pollution-free air, have nevertheless recognized a right to do at least some polluting of the air.
The Supreme Court of Georgia in Holman v. Athens Empire
Laundry Company," made a classic exception-gobble-up-the-rule
statement on the subject:
Every person has the right to have the air diffused over his
premises, whether located in the city or country, in its natural
state and free from artificial impurities.
(a) By air in its natural state and free from artificial impurities is meant pure air consistent with the locality and character
of the community.
(b) The pollution of the air, so far as reasonably necessary to
the enjoyment of life and indispensable to the progress of society,
is not actionable.
(c) The privilege of use incident to the right 6f property must
not be exercised in an unreasonable manner, so as to inflict injury
upon another unnecessarily.' 2
Most courts have reached the result of allowing air pollution
as long as the pollution is not unreasonable or unnecessary by "balancing the equities" between property-owning litigants asserting
their right to use their property as they wish. The courts have been
especially impressed by the need to "balance equities" when the
would-be private pollution controller asks for an injunction instead
of, or in addition to, damages.
The oft-cited cases of Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper 6
Iron Company 8 and Hulbert v. CaliforniaPortland Cement Company'4 demonstrate the approach in air pollution cases of a court
committed to the necessity and desirability of balancing the equities
and a court which rejects the balancing concept.
In Ducktown the Supreme Court of Tennessee had before it
bills grounded in nuisance and based on damages suffered by complainants from air pollutants discharged by the plants of the de.
fendants. The court recognized that the general effect of the
pollutants made it impossible for complainants to raise and harvesi
149 Ga. 345, 100 S.E. 207 (1919).
Id. (court syllabus). It is interesting to note that American Jurisprudence, whet
stating the rule for which it cites this case, states: "But this right of pollution mus
not be exercised in an unreasonable manner so as to inflict injury upon another un
necessarily...." 39 Am. JUR. Nuisances § 53 (1942) (emphasis added).
13 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
1t 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
2"

12

1132

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1967: 1126

their customary crops, largely destroyed the timber on their properties, and prevented them "from using and enjoying their farms
and homes as they did prior to the inauguration of these enterprises."15
Yet, in spite of these serious consequences, the court, balancing
the equities in favor of the defendants, declined to grant injunctive
relief. 16 Since it was impossible for defendants to reduce their ores
in a different manner, or remove to a more remote location,' 7 the
court concluded that such relief would compel defendants to stop
operating their plants, make their properties practically worthless,' 8
destroy almost one-half the county tax base, and cause 10,000 people
to leave their homes in search of employment.' 9 Thus, the court
reasoned:
In order to protect by injunction several small tracts of land,
aggregating in value less than $1,000, we are asked to destroy
other property worth nearly $2,000,000, and wreck two great
mining and manufacturing enterprises ....

The result would

be practically a confiscation of the property of the defendants for
the benefit of the complainants-an appropriation without compensation. .

.

. We appreciate the argument based on the fact

that the homes of the complainants who live on the small tracts
of land referred to are not so comfortable and useful to their
owners as they were before they were affected by the smoke
complained of, and we are deeply sensible of the truth of the
proposition that no man is entitled to any more rights than
another on the ground that he has or owns more property than
that other. But in a case of confficting rights, where neither party
can enjoy his own without in some measure restricting the liberty
of the other in the use of property, the law must make the best
arrangement it can between the contending parties, with a view
to preserving to each one the largest measure of liberty possible
under the circumstances. We see no escape from the conclusion
in the present case that the only proper decree is to allow the
complainants a reference for the ascertainment of damages, and
that the injunction must be denied to them. .... 20
In Hulbert the plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the
defendant to cease discharging cement dust, which had been falling
1

113 Tenn. at 340, 83 S.W. at 659.

'a Id. at 366, 83 S.W. at 666.
1'"Id.

is Id. at 343, 83 S.W. at 660.
29 Id. at 366, 83 S.W. at 666.

20 Td.

Vol. 1967: 1126)

AIR POLLUTION

1133

on their properties. The dust, it seems, not only filtered through
the plaintiffs' homes, but also formed an "opaque semi-cemented encrustation upon the upper sides of all exposed flowers and foliage," and particularly upon the citrus fruit grown by plaintiffs. 21
Unlike ordinary dust, these cement deposits were not capable of
being "dissipated by the strongest winds, nor washed off through the
action of the most protracted rains." 22 In light of these conditions,
the lower court found the value of plaintiffs' citrus fruit was decreased, that the constant presence of the dust on the leaves and
limbs of the trees made cultivation and harvesting of the crop more
expensive, and that the presence of the dust in plaintiffs' homes
made life less pleasant.2
The defendant made the usual defenses that he was doing all
that could be done to keep the dust from being discharged, that damages were sufficient to compensate plaintiffs for their injury, and
after stressing the size of its payroll and resulting benefit to the community, contended for the rule that "the resulting injuries must be
balanced by the court, and ... where the hardship inflicted upon
one party by the granting of an injunction would be very much
greater than that which would be suffered by the other party if
the nuisance were permitted to continue, injunctive relief should be
denied."M
After discussing and citing numerous cases pro and con of
the question of balancing equities in such cases, the Supreme Court
of California affirmed the granting of the injunction. The writer
of the court's opinion, Justice Melvin, quoted with approval one of
the strongest rejections of the balancing doctrine:
'Of course great interests should not be overthrown on trifling or
frivolous grounds, as where the maxim de minimis non curat lex
is applicable; but every substantial, material right of person or
property is entitled to protection against all the world. It is by
protecting the most humble in his small estate ... that the poor
man is ultimately enabled to become a capitalist himself. If the
smaller interest must yield to the larger, all small property rights,
and all small and less important enterprises, industries, and pursuits would sooner or later be absorbed by the large, more powerful few; and their development to condition of great value and
21161 Cal. at 244, 118 P. at 930.
2Id.
28td.

2Id. at 246, 118 P. at 931.
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importance, both to the individual and the public, would be
arrested in its incipiency.' 25
Although no attempt has been made to count the cases, it is
submitted that the Ducktown position is that most frequently taken
by the courts. For even the most zealous of pollution controllers to
reject the Ducktown position would be inconsistent and selfdefeating, since his ultimate concern is protecting society from the
harm caused by individuals using their property contrary to the
public interest. What is regrettable and unacceptable from a
pollution control standpoint about Ducktown is not that the court
determined its action by a greatest good to the greatest number
standard, but that it did not consider possible harm from the air
pollution in question to thousands and even millions of citizens
other than the immediate complainants. Only when this additional
consideration is added to the scale can there be a true balancing of
26
the equities.
Certain technical aspects of the law of nuisance may keep the
2t5Id.

at 251, 118 P. at 933, quoting Judge Sawyer in Woodruff v. North Bloomfield

Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 807 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
Gravel
2

6 In Keeton & Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18 TEXAS L. REv. 412,
420 (1940), the authors take the position that the plaintiff is usually seeking an injunction in order to exact the highest price possible for his property. The note discusses
the decision in Ducktown, concluding that the community livelihood which was
dependent upon the industry's continuance was justification for not allowing the injunction. Id. The writers do speculate, however, that a better remedy than common
law actions for damages should perhaps be devised to protect the interests of the
plaintiffs. Id.
Even absent a better remedy, Keeton and Morris suggest that compensatory relief
is usually the proper solution and, if deterrence is the motivating factor for granting
relief, punitive damages would be more likely to produce desirable results than an
injunction. Id. at 424. They argue that "if the defendant is conducting an enterprise of social value exceeding the social value of the plaintiff's interests, the common
weal may best be served by permitting the defendant's plant to remain undisturbed,
requiring him to compensate the plaintiff for his financial losses, and punishing him
sufficiently for mis-locating his plant to discourage similar future wrongdoing. After
all, we do not condemn to death the child conceived illicitly, nor is it always wise to
destroy the factory which should not have been built. Perhaps in a community which
has too many factories, destruction of a few may work a social benefit rather than a
social harm. But if industrial birth control is needed, injunction for nuisance can
hardly be counted on to do the job." Id. at 425.
The analogy between factories that should not have been built and illegitimate
children is at best contrived. Absent proper zoning and pollution control laws, and
given the complexity of obtaining punitive damages, injunctions may be the only way
to control the pollution. See note 49 infra for a discussion of punitive damages.
For an example of judicious use of an injunction see Renken v. Harvey Aluminium,
Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963), discussed in notes 64-69 infra and accompanying
text.
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private pollution controller from obtaining damages-much less an
injunction. For example, if the nuisance is labeled "public" rather
than private, in order to prevail the objector must demonstrate that
he has or will suffer some "special injury" other than that which the
general public will suffer. Otherwise only the state through its
agents or officials may proceed. 27 If the party complaining of the
pollution can convince the court that the pollution is one which
affects a single individual or a determinate number of persons in
the enjoyment of some right not common to the public, then
theoretically at least, he need not worry about showing special
damage since the nuisance will be labeled "private." Since public
nuisances are defined as those which "affect an interest common
to the general public, rather than peculiar to one individual or
several, ' 28 and since the "special damage" must be different in kind
from that suffered by the general public and not just different in
degree,29 it is at least arguable that most instances of air pollution
are public nuisances rather than private due to the wide diffusion of
air pollutants through shifting winds and storms. Thus, if the
courts persist in their "kind" rather than "degree" distinction,
the increased understanding of the widespread effects of what has
previously been thought of as localized air pollution may render the
private nuisance action against air pollution less frequently available
30
than in the past.
If the private pollution controller does succeed in having the
nuisance of which he complains labeled "private," there may be
*7"As a general rule a public nuisance gives no right of action to any individual but
must be abated by process instituted in the name of the state." Holman v. Athens
Empire Laundery Co., 149 Ga. 345, 349, 100 S.E. 207, 209 (1919). See also Prosser,
Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. Rav. 997 (1966). Since the complainer

of a private nuisance must show an interference with the use and enjoyment of land,
the only type of nuisance action available to many injured by air pollution may be
the public nuisance-special damage action. See generally PROSSER § 89, at 611-14.
In discussing the distinction between public and private
28 PROSSER § 89, at 606.
nuisance, Prosser uses a water pollution situation as one of his textual examples:
"Thus the pollution of a stream which merely inconveniences a number of riparian
owners is a private nuisance only, but it may become a public one if it kills the fish."
Id. at 606-07.
20Id. at 608.

30 "The nuisance cases are virtually impossible to summarize or even categorize since
they differ so greatly from state to state as to the reasonability of the defendant's
conduct, the nature of the plaintiff's interest, and the interrelationship with other
remedies, such as public nuisance." Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung
Damage Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33

BROOKLYN

L. REV. 17, 25 (1966).
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another difficult obstacle to overcome. If the pollution has been
continuing for some time, the polluter's wrongdoing may have ripened into a judicially protected right through the application of
that magical concept of property law-prescriptive rights-which
with its twin-adverse possession-rewards wrongdoers who are
patient, persistent, and non-reforming. In Hulbert, for example,
even though the court was willing to go farther than most courts
and enjoin a plant from operating as long as it polluted the air, it
also held that the petitioner could not complain about the operation
of one of defendant's other plants because the statute of limitations
had run and defendant had thereby obtained a prescriptive right
as to the operation of that plant.8'
31"Mhe defendant had acquired a prescriptive right to manufacture the maximum
quantity of cement produced annually by that factory." 161 Cal. at 244, 118 P. at 930.
That a prescriptive right to maintain a private nuisance of air pollution may be
obtained was early recognized by the English courts in Crump v. Lambert, [1867] L.R.
3 Eq. 409, 413, and has been followed by both federal and state courts in the United
States. E.g., Dangelo v. McLean Fire Brick Co., 287 F. 14 (6th Cir. 1923); Herrlich v.
New York Cent. & H.R.R., 70 Misc. 115, 126 N.Y.S. 311 (Sup. Ct. 1910); see H. WOOD,
THE LAW OF NuisANcEs §§ 712-20 (2d ed. 1883). However, many courts that have been
presented with the problem have declined to recognize a prescriptive right because of
the defendant's failure to meet the necessary burden of proof. E.g., Ralston v. United
Verde Cooper Co., 37 F.2d 180 (D. Ariz. 1929), aff'd, 46 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1931); Campbell
v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568 (1876); Bradbury Marble Co. v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 128 Mo.
App. 96, 106 S.W. 594 (1907).
In Stamm v. City of Albuquerque, 10 N.M. 491, 503, 62 P. 973, 974 (1900), the court
said: "Theoretically, the right may be ... acquired, but practically there are very few
cases in which it can be established." Accord, H. WooD, supra at § 712. Thus one
claiming such a right assumes the burden of showing that for the full period of the
statute of limitations he has asserted and exercised the right to violate the law to the
extent and with the results charged and proved against him, with the practical acquiescence of the person injured, and to the extent that during the whole time an
action would lie against him. Id. §§ 713, 715-16, 718.
Much of the confusion in the area stems from the analytical problem of identifying
the analogous grant of an easement to which this prescriptive right may be compared.
The problem in such an analysis arises from the fact that the polluter is committing an
act on his own land, rather than fulfilling the formal requirements of an easement
by entering the victim's land. Dangelo v. McLean Fire Brick Co., supra, a case which
upheld the ability to maintain such a prescriptive right, dismissed the problem by
finding entry in the deposit of substances on the plaintiff's land by the defendant.
The court drew an analogy to the field of water pollution and prescriptive user.
Because air pollution has historically been the basis of nuisance actions, the courts
have developed an intermediate theory which is far more analogous to prescriptive
user than to adverse possession, and have avoided dealing with the problems that
would arise from an analysis of the ownership of the air. Other problems that have
contributed to an already befogged-or smogged as the case may be-area, however,
are the application of the theories of laches and of judicial grace in balancing equities
in actions seeking equitable relief. See, e.g., Hulbert v. California Portland Cement
Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911); Richards' Appeal, 57 Pa. 105 (1868); Madison v.
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 SA.. 658 (1904).
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Another concept of the law of nuisance which may strike down
the would-be private controller of air pollution is the doctrine commonly referred to as "coming to the nuisance." In Waschak v.
Moffat,3 2 for example, although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reversed a judgment for damages, primarily on other grounds, which
the jury found plaintiffs to have sustained from defendant's emission
of pollutants, the court, quoting Justice Musmanno in an earlier
lower court decision, stated:
'The plaintiffs are subject to an annoyance. This we accept,
but it is an annoyance they have freely assumed. Because they
desired and needed a residential proximity to their places of
employment, they chose to found their abode here. It is not for
them to repine; and it is probable that upon reflection they will,
in spite of the annoyance which they suffer, still conclude that,
after all, one's bread is more important than landscape or clear
skies.
Without smoke, Pittsburgh would have remained a very pretty
village.'3 3
Although Waschak is not in accordance with the prevailing rule
as to "coming to the nuisance," the doctrine is still likely to plague
the complainer of pollution, if not in estoppel terms, as a matter
to be considered in "balancing the equities."3 4
Since it is well established that no prescriptive right may be obtained in reference
to a public nuisance, Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); Dolata v.
Berthelet Fuel & Supply Co., 254 Wis. 194, 86 N.W.2d 97 (1949), the trend toward
dealing with air pollution both legislatively and judicially as a public rather than
private nuisance problem has decreased the availability of prescriptive right as a
defense for air polluters. As there is less and less room for the prescriptive polluter
to operate, and as police regulation becomes more widespread, the concept of a prescriptive right to pollute the air may soon only be remembered as an historical example
of judicial legerdemain.
82 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954).
BeId. at 452, 109 A.2d at 316 (emphasis in original). It is interesting to note that
Justice Musmanno, a supreme court justice at the time of the instant case, dissented
from the majority opinion. Id. at 455, 109 A.2d at 318.
8,,"The question frequently arises, whether the plaintiff assumes the risk and is
barred from recovery by the fact that he has 'come to the nuisance' by purchasing land
and moving in next to it after it is already in existence or operation. The prevailing
rule is that in the absence of a prescriptive right the defendant cannot condemn the
surrounding premises to endure the nuisance, and that the purchaser is entitled to
the reasonable use and enjoyment of his land to the same extent as any other owner,
so long as he buys in good faith and not for the sole purpose of a vexatious lawsuit.
This is true in particular, for obvious reasons, of public nuisances, and of those private
ones which the defendant could abate at any reasonable cost. There are cases, however, which have held that the plaintiff is barred by his voluntary choice of a place
to live, particularly where the defendant's activity is one in which the public has a
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TRESPASS

The complainer of air pollution who cannot or may not be able
to push a nuisance action past the balance of equities, public vs.
private, prescription, and "coming to the nuisance" hurdles may
need to or wish to ground his cause of action on a theory other than
nuisance. Trespass in many instances is a suitable alternative.
In addition to the possibility of avoiding the difficulties discussed above, there are two other distinct advantages to proceeding
on a theory of trespass rather than nuisance. First, there are burden
and necessity of proof differences since, at least in theory, no damage
need be shown for a plaintiff to prevail in a trespass action while in
nuisance actual damages must be proved. Secondly, and usually
more importantly, statutes of limitations are generally considerably
shorter for nuisance actions than for trespass.
Most of the important aspects of pollution control where trespass
is used as the theory of the action can be seen by looking at the
litigation which has resulted from the air pollution caused by one
aluminum plant-the Reynolds Aluminum plant at Troutdale,
Oregon. There are three cases to examine: (1) Arvidson v. Reynolds
Metals Company,35 decided by the Federal District Court for the
Western District of Washington in 1954, (2) Fairview Farms, Incorporated v. Reynolds Metals Company,3 6 which was decided on
July 9, 1959, by the Federal District Court for Oregon, and (3)
Martin v. Reynolds Metals Company,3 7 decided by the Supreme
Court of Oregon on July 29, 1959.

In Arvidson the plaintiffs, who operated farms in Washington,
sought damages and injunctive relief against defendant because of
alleged damage to lands and cattle claimed to have been caused
by fluorides discharged from defendant's Troutdale plant. The court
noted that aluminum is produced in a manner that unavoidably
causes fluorides to be discharged into the atmosphere from the
plant stacks, and that these fluorides eventually may be deposited on
major interest; and the safer and more accurate statement would appear to be that
'coming to the nuisance' is merely one factor, although clearly not the most important
one, to be weighed in the scale along with the other elements which bear upon the
question of 'reasonable use.'" PROSSER § 92, at 632.
311125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957).
30 176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Ore. 1959).
3 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959). cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
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plant. 38

In addition, it recoglands within a ten-mile radius of the
nized that "[filuorides of some of the types escaping from the plants,
if ingested in excessive quantities, are capable of causing damage
to cattle."3 9
Nevertheless, the court found for defendants, and in so doing
gave a rather mild "balance the equities" argument:
Whether the measures taken by defendant to minimize the escape
of fluorides from its plants are the maximum possible consistent
with practical operating requirements is yet to be determined, but
apparently American industry has not yet developed anything
better. The record shows that the United States has a very important interest in the continued operation of these plants for
their large scale production of aluminum essential to national
defense. 40
In reference to plaintiffs' theory of action, the court commented:
In the complaints and pretrial orders plaintiffs grounded the
actions in trespass, as distinguished from trespass on the 4case, and
later asserted nuisance as an alternative basis of liability. '
Implicit in this court's limitation decision was determination of
the legal basis of the actions as being trespass on the case under
Washington law.... A review of the Washington cases ... leaves

this court in no doubt but that the Washington Supreme Court
regards claims of the nature of those presented in these cases as
being based on common law trespass on the case as distinguished
from trespass quare clausum fregit....

The Washington court holds that when the injury complained
of is the immediate and direct result of defendant's acts or omissions, the action is for trespass whereas when the injury is consequential, the action is on the case ....

The distinction drawn by

the Washington court between immediate and consequential injury is based on the character of the acts or omissions causing the
injury and on whether the injury results immediately upon the
occurrence of the act or omission. In the present cases the injury
to plaintiffs, if any, was of a nonintentional character occurring a
considerable time following the failure of [sic] inability of defendant to completely eliminate the effluence of fluorides from its
plants; accordingly, the injury was consequential rather than im38 125 F. Supp. at 482-83.
89 Id. at 483.
"0Id.
1
1 d. at 486.
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mediate and direct as those terms are interpreted by the Washington court in the law of trespass.4
In Fairview Farms the plaintiff, which conducted a dairy farming
operation in Oregon near Reynolds' Troutdale plant, 8 filed an
action in trespass and also sought a permanent injunction against
Reynolds, alleging that its dairy cows had been injured by fluorides
which had entered its lands from Reynolds' plant, and that the
fume control system in that plant was not efficient. Reynolds denied
plaintiff's contentions pleading de minimis, and in the alternative
44
pleaded that the action lie in nuisance.
The court rejected both the de minimis and nuisance-ratherthan-trespass arguments:
A few cases hold directly contra to the holding of this Court, but
a reading of those cases leaves this Court with the impression that
the foreign jurisdiction was looking past the initial question of
whether there was in fact a trespass and was concerned with balancing the equities to determine the existence or nonexistence of
a trespass. That line of cases this Court rejects, and holds that
air-borne liquids and solids deposited upon the Fairview lands
constituted a trespass. As early as 1911 the Oregon Court recognized our changing society ....
One of these changes is scientific development which today allows
the court, with the aid of scientific detecting methods, to determine
the existence of a physical entry of tangible matter, which in turn
gives rise to a cause of action in trespass under the Oregon Court's
holding that every unauthorized entry upon land of another constitutes actionable trespass.4 5
The court held that the statute of limitations as to trespass applied and therefore allowed damages for a six-year period. Injunctive relief was denied, however, on the theory that the pollution was
not reasonably certain to be repeated and that the defendant had
apparently done all it could to control the pollution.
The plaintiffs in Martin, also Oregon cattle raisers near the
2 Id. at 487-88.
48 There was a long history of previous transactions between Reynolds and Fairview
concerning the deposit of fluorides on Fairview's farms. Reynolds had continuously
informed Fairview of areas of excessive fluoride deposits where cattle should not be
grazed and had paid Fairview feed costs from 1947 to 1951. 176 F. Supp. at 183.
" Id. at 184. The court stated that a trespass action in Oregon carried a six-year
statute of limitations, Opz. REv. STAT. § 12.080 (Supp. 1965), while a nontrespassory
action carried a two-year limitation. Id.
"5Id. at 186.
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Troutdale plant, alleged that their cattle were poisoned by ingesting the fluorides which escaped from defendant's alumium plant
and contaminated the forage and water on their land. On appeal
from a verdict for plaintiffs below, the defendant's principal assignment of error was its contention that the trial court was mistaken in
identifying the defendant's invasion of the plaintiffs' land as a
trespass.
According to the court, the "gist" of the defendant's argument
was that "a trespass arises only when there has been 'breaking and
entering upon real property,' constituting a direct, as distinguished
46
from a consequential invasion of the possessor's interest in land,
and that the mere settling of fluoride deposits upon the plaintiffs'
land was not sufficient to meet these requirements. 47 The court,
however, was not persuaded:
The view recognizing a trespassory invasion where there is no
"thing" which can be seen with the naked eye undoubtedly runs
counter to the definition of trespass expressed in some quarters....
It is quite possible that in an earlier day when science had
not yet peered into the molecular and atomic world of small
particles, the courts could not fit an invasion through unseen
physical instrumentalities into the requirement that a trespass
can result only from a direct invasion. But in this atomic age
even the uneducated know the great and awful force contained in
the atom and what it can do to a man's property if it is released.
In fact, the now famous equation E = mc has taught us that mass
and energy are equivalents and that our concept of "things" must
be refrained. If these observations on science in relation to the.
law of trespass should appear theoretical and unreal in the abstract, they become very practical and real to the possessor of
land when the unseen force cracks the foundation of his house.
The force is just as real if it is chemical in nature and must be
awakened by the intervention of another agency before it does
harm.
If, then, we must look to the character of the instrumentality
which is used in making an intrusion upon another's land we
prefer to emphasize the object's energy or force rather than its size.
Viewed in this way we may define trespass as any intrusion which
invades the possessor's protected interest in exclusive possession,
whether that intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter
1' 221 Ore. at 89, 342 P.2d at 791.
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or by energy which can be measured only by the mathematical
language of the physicist.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the intrusion of the
fluoride particulates in the present case constituted a trespass. 48
While Martin and Fairview foretell greater success for private
pollution controllers who ground their causes in trespass rather
than in nuisance, they nevertheless face the problem of the trespass
having occurred over a period of time so that a prescriptive right may
have accrued. If so, the only hope for the would-be pollution controller would seem to be to fall back on the idea that the pollution
constituted a public nuisance against which no prescriptive right
may ripen and then attempt to prove special damages.
NEGLIGENCE

A third legal basis for private control of air pollution that causes
injury to property or person is through an action for damages based
on negligence. 49 For example, in the case of Greyhound Corpora"'Id. at 93-94, 342 P.2d at 793-94.
9 One reason a plaintiff may wish to proceed on a negligence theory is the greater
likelihood of obtaining punitive damages than if he phrased his cause in trespass or
nuisance. It is difficult, however, to present a prevailing judicial consensus as to
the availability of punitive damages under any of these possible theories of recovery.
To say that the majority of jurisdictions allow the awarding of such damages would
be misleading, since within this majority there is no common view as to the theory
upon which the allowance of such damages is based. Moreover, four states reject
punitive damages entirely: Louisiana, Moore v. Blanchard, 216 La. 253, 43 So. 2d 599
(1949); Massachusetts, City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass.
257, 47 N.E.2d 1021 (1943); Nebraska, Wilfong v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 129 Neb. 600,
262 N.W. 537 (1935); and Washington, Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wash. 2d 894, 246 P.2d
853 (1952). Two states, Michigan and New Hampshire, allow such damages but regard
them as extra compensation for injured feelings or sense of outrage rather than punishment. Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922); Bruton v. Leavitt Stores
Corp., 87 N.H. 304, 179 A. 185 (1935). Connecticut, on the other hand, limits punitive
damages to the expenses of litigation less taxable costs. Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941). The traditional view has been that punitive
damages are to be awarded when there is present an element of oppression, malice,
fraudulent or evil motive, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests
of others that the conduct may be called wilful and wanton. See, e.g., Knierim v.
Izzo, 22 III. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 233 N.C. 723,
73 S.E.2d 785 (1953).
Two theories of punitive damages will be mentioned in this note. The first, in
connection with the Reynolds cases, is the Oregon position; and the second is the
Indiana principle, which is based on the double jeopardy doctrine.
In Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 316 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1963), the court of
appeals reversed and remanded the case for consideration of various issues of damages
saying: "The District Court erred in withdrawing appellees' claim for punitive damages from the consideration of the jury. Where there is evidence that the injury was
done maliciously or wilfully and wantonly or committed with bad motive or recklessly
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the plaintiff was allowed substantial recovery in

a negligence action for the brain and nerve damage she allegedly
suffered from breathing air containing a substantial amount of

carbon monoxide while a passenger on defendant's bus.
Of course, the gravamen of an action for damages based on negligence is a showing by the plaintiff of defendant's negligence and a

causal relation between the negligence and plaintiff's injury. This
is not a particularly onerous task when a deadly pollutant such as
carbon monoxide is involved in air admittedly under defendant's
exclusive control-as in Blakley. However, where one brings an
action for lung damage against a local cement plant, for example,
the case gets extremely difficult from a causation standpoint. 51
so as to imply a disregard of social obligations, punitive damages are justified. Fisher
v. Carlin, 219 Ore. 159, 346 P.2d 641.
"Here the record discloses that appellants had known for several years that fluorides
from their plant were settling on appellees' land, with resultant damage to appellees'
crops. It thus could have been found that their trespass was done knowingly and
wilfully, that it was intentional and in wanton disregard of appellants' social obligations.
"To justify an award of punitive damages, it is not necessary that the act have been
done maliciously or with bad motive. Where it has become apparent, as it has here,
that compensatory damages alone, while they might compensate the injured party,
will not deter the actor from committing similar trespasses in the future, there is
ample justification for an award of punitive damages." Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
On rehearing, 324 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1963), the court upheld the award of punitive
damages made by the jury as permissible under Oregon law.
It is noted that while this case applied state law pursuant to the diversity rules of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the extension of the punitive damages doctrine to an area in which deterrence is the motivating factor for allowing the award
was purely judicial in nature. If the application of the Reynolds' cases, as far as
grounding civil actions for air pollution in trespass and nuisance, is comparable, then
the possibility of an extension of the punitive damages doctrine in federal cases
grounded in trespass or nuisance as a preventive measure against polluters is a distinct possibility.
Indiana's position on punitive damages is based on a state supreme court decision
handed down in 1854-Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854). Pursuant to the principles
delineated in that case, there can be no recovery of punitive damages if the civil tort
is also a crime. Indiana is only one of three states which maintain such a doctrine,
the others being Colorado, Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541 (1884), and Georgia, Cherry
v. McCall, 23 Ga. 193 (1857). Aldridge, in The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary
Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IND. L.J. 123 (1945), analyzes the position as being
based upon the theory that such an award would be unconstitutional under the
double jeopardy clause of the state constitution and the federal constitution. Its
special application to air and water pollution suits instituted by private individuals
will depend upon the construction of the applicable statutes by the courts to determine
whether the statutory penalties are criminal in nature so as to deny any recovery of
punitive damages by a plaintiff in a civil action.
50 262 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1958).
51 Rheingold asserts that the victim of urban air pollution can recover by joining
the major polluters in the area. Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung Damage
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The typical air pollution oriented causation problems can be
5 2 Mrs. Hagy
seen in Hagy v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation.
sought recovery for damages suffered to her larynx when she and her
husband drove through smog which she alleged to have contained
injurious sulfuric acid compounds negligently emitted from defendant's plant under inversion conditions.5 3 As the court stated:
[T]he theory of plaintiffs' case is (1) that Mrs. Hagy had a cancer
of the larynx before her exposure to the smog but it had not been
diagnosed as such, and her condition was such that she did not
know it; (2) that her exposure to the smog and the irritation
therefrom "lighted up" the dormant cancer; (3) that immediately
following the exposure she lost her voice; (4) that her doctors
then pressed their examinations, ruled out tuberculosis, took a
biopsy of the larynx, and determined therefrom that she had a
cancer of the larynx; (5) that a complete laryngectomy was then
performed; and (6) that such operation might have been averted
had she not been exposed to the smog and irritation therefrom.5 4
The defendant did not challenge the "take your victim as you
find him" concepts of section 461 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts5 5 relied upon by plaintiffs, but based its appeal upon the
Due to Pollution of Urban Atmosphere, 33 BRooxLYN L. REV. 17, 18, 27 (1966). None
of the cases cited, however, support this contention. In fact, the only negligence case
cited in the discussion is Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265
P.2d 86 (1954). Rheingold's proposition nevertheless seems to be sound. As long as
sufficient testimony can be presented on causation to get to and persuade the jury,
there is no reason why simple joint tortfeasor principles should not be applied and
recovery allowed accordingly. In this connection, Rheingold states without citing
authority: "It is believed that generally it would be necessary to join no more than
three parties in order to have under suit the agencies contributing the majority of the
pollutants in the air." Rheingold, supra at 28.
32 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P.2d 86 (1954).
a""[A]n inversion is a condition in which, instead of being warm near the ground
and cold at a higher altitude, the air is cold near the ground and warm at a higher
altitude. Since the cold air cannot and does not rise, as warm air would, the impurities which find themselves in the atmosphere are not carried away and a so-called
smog results. Moreover, when there is a descending motion in the atmosphere ... the
impurities are actually brought down to ground level." Id. at 363, 265 P.2d at 88.
5Id. at 367, 265 P.2d at 90 (emphasis in original).
5
r RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 (1965) states: "Harm Increased In Extent
By -Other's Unforeseeable Physical Condition.
"The negligent actor is subject to liability for harm to another although a physical
condition of the other which is neither known nor should be known to the actor
makes the injury greater than that which the actor as a reasonable man should have
foreseen as a probable result of this conduct.
. -0.-

"Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section applies not only where the peculiar physical condition which makes the other's injuries greater than the actor expected is not known
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assertion that as a matter of law the evidence was insufficient to
permit the jury to find a causal connection between the smog and
Mrs. Hagy's condition. The court affirmed the verdict below on the
ground that:
The burden did not rest upon respondents to prove that the
removal of respondents larynx would not have been necessary
but for her exposure to the smog; the burden was rather upon
appellants to convince the jury that the operation would have been
ultimately necessary in any event, even though the cancerous
56
larynx had not been traumatized by the irritation of the smog.
The defendant in Hagy admitted negligence.5 7 Absent such
an admission or unless some strict liability principle can be applied,58 it would not be worthwhile to show a causal relationship
between plaintiff's injury and defendant's act unless it can also be
shown that the defendant was acting negligently. Once again, litigation over pollution by Reynolds' Troutdale plant is informative. In
Martin v. Reynolds Metals Company,59 members of the Martin
family brought actions for personal injuries which they allegedly
suffered from the fluorine compounds escaping from defendant's
plant. They presented witnesses as to the escape of toxic substances.
The defendant, however, moved for a nonsuit. The court denied
the motion, saying:
to him, but also where the actor could not have discovered it by the exercise of reason-

able care, or, indeed even where it is unknown to the person suffering it or to anyone
else until after the harm is sustained. A negligent actor must bear the risk that his
liability will be increased by reason of the actual physical condition of the other
towards whom his act is negligent.
"Illustrations:

1. Through the motorman's negligent management of the A Company's trolley car
the control lever strikes the breast of B, a passenger. The injury is apparently slight,

but it causes a cancerous tendency to 'light up' and localize itself in the injured point,

requiring the amputation of B's breast. A is answerable for the harm caused by the

cancer and the amputation."
88 122 Cal. App. 2d at 370, 265 P.2d at 92.
5T "Appellants do not contend that there is insufficient evidence of negligence in
the operation of their plant on that evening. At the opening of the discussion they
say: 'For the purpose of argument, we may assume that Allied should have discovered
the inversion and stopped operating sooner than it did and that accordingly it did
not act as a reasonably prudent producer of sulphuric acid would have acted under the
circumstances.'" Id. at 364, 265 P.2d at 88.
38Where inherently dangerous gases are the pollutants, the plaintiff might argue
ultrahazardous activity and seek the penumbra of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330
(1868). See notes 70-86 infra and accompanying text.
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide,
89 135 F. Supp. 379 (D. Ore. 1952), aff'd sub noma.
258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958).
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When the plaintiff proved the emanation of fluorine compounds
from the plant of the defendant and the injury suffered by him
as a result thereof, he made out a prima-fade case of negligence on
the part of the defendant. So far as I am able to ascertain from
the record no attempt has been made by the defendant to prove
the cause of the emanation or the escaping of the fluorine componds so it is a question for the jury with all the evidence
before it whether a preponderance of such evidence is in favor
of the plaintiff. 60
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.0 1 This
court first commented that there was sufficient evidence of causation
between plaintiffs' injuries and the fluorides escaping from defendant's plant to support a jury verdict to that effect. In respect
to the second point of the case, the submission to the jury of the
question of negligence on the basis of res ipsa loquitor, the defendant argued strongly that it did all that was reasonable to prevent the escape of fluorides. The court, however, stressed the
superior knowledge of defendant and the duty such knowledge places
on a defendant under section 289 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 62 and testimony that the customary operation of an aluminum
plant would not ordinarily cause damage to persons in the vicinity,
and held that these two considerations made the case a proper one
63
for the application of the doctrine of res ispa loquitor.
Unfortunately, however, Yturbide [Martin below] leaves the
basic "standard of care" question unanswered. Has a polluter met
the standard of care required if he shows, for example, that he puts
out fewer pollutants than any other operation of his type or that he
uses all available pollution control devices? Maybe there is no
other way to produce aluminum-or what seems to impress courts
just as much-no other economical way. All of which puts the
6oId. at 382.

81 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1958).
02 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965) states:
"Recognizing Existence of Risk
The actor is required to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing an
invasion of another's interest if a reasonable man would do so while exercising (a)
such attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of other pertinent
matters, intelligence, and judgment as a reasonable man would have; and (b) such
superior attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment as the
actor himself has."

63 It is interesting to note that the court of appeals in a previous unreported decision on the same case thought the case proper for the application of Rylands v.
Fletcher concepts. 258 F.2d at 326.
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court and/or jury in the position of having to grapple with a political, even philosophical, question-should the manufacturer be considered negligent if he does not use all pollution control devices
available, even if his profit margin will be reduced or even elimi-

nated by so doing.
The standard to which the courts will hold the producer of
pollutants depends in final analysis upon the view the judge and
jury take of the social utility of pollution control, which is in turn
a product of how serious a danger to our society they consider air
pollution. The standard no doubt will be seriously affected not only
by the state of scientific knowledge as to the causes and effects of air
pollution, but also by the state of technology and the extent to which
present pollution control devices are effective and economically
feasible.

64
The recent case of Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Incorporated,
although trespass rather than negligence oriented, indicates the
approach to "standard of care" the courts should take and which they
no doubt will take when the importance of air pollution is impressed
upon them.
After hearing expert witnesses, the Renken court concluded
that the installation of cell hoods and electrostatic precipitators
would greatly reduce, if not entirely eliminate, the escape of the
harmful fluorides being emitted from the defendant's aluminum
plant,6 5 and required the defendant to install such devices within
one year or be enjoined from further air polluting operations. 6
The court reasoned:

While the cost of the installations of these additional controls
will be a substantial sum, the fact remains that effective controls
must be exercised over the escape of these noxious fumes. Such
expenditures would not be so great as to substantially deprive
defendant of the use of its property. While we are not dealing
with the public as such, we must recognize that air pollution is
one of the great problems now facing the American public. If
necessary, the cost of installing adequate controls must be passed
on to the ultimate consumer. The heavy cost of corrective devices
is no reason why plaintiffs should stand by and suffer substantial
damage.67
6' 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963).
13 Id.

at 172.

" Id. at 176.
67 Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
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[O]nce the plaintiffs established that fluorides were deposited
on their lands from the plant of the defendant, the burden of going
forward with the evidence was on the defendant to show that the
use of its property, which caused the injury, was unavoidable or
that it could not be prevented except by the expenditure of such
as would substantially deprive it of the use of
vast sums of money
68
its property.
There is no room for application of the doctrine of balancing
of the equities at this time. The required improvements should
entirely eliminate the problem.6 9
Renken properly suggests that the standard required of those
who produce pollutants is that they use all available pollution control devices regardless of their cost so long as the expense does not
substantially deprive defendants of the use of their property. The
question that even Renken leaves unanswered, however, is what
approach the court should take in setting the required standard of
conduct or deciding to grant an injunction when the defendant uses
all presently available pollution control devices, but refuses either
alone or in conjunction with the rest of the industry to conduct or
share the cost of research to develop more efficient methods of pollution control. While public pollution control is doubtless the best
avenue for assuring the development of as effective pollution control
devices as the existing state of technology will support, there would
seem to be no reason why a court confronted with a negligence action
should not consider the defendant's activities in developing better
control devices as one of the elements in judging the reasonableness
of his conduct. Similarly, it would seem that a court confronted
with a nuisance or trespass action should take this same matter into
consideration as part of the balancing of equities in deciding whether
or not an injunction will issue.
STRICT

LIABILITY

Although strict liability concepts do not necessarily give rise
to a separate "cause of action,1 70 they may be and often are used by
complainers of air pollution. In the broadest sense of the term both
68Id. at

174.
6Id. at 176. The court comments in reference to the Fairview Farms case that:
"The basic reason the Court did not grant an injunction in the Fairview case was
that there was no evidence the acts or conduct of Reynolds were reasonably certain
to be repeated in the future." Id. at 173.
TOSee note 7 supra.
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nuisance 72

and
are strict liability oriented since recovery
may be had without a showing of fault. In the air pollution field,
however, individuals often suffer personal injury or property damage from emissions of poisonous gases which result from activities
that cannot be easily labeled a nuisance or with respect to which
the courts may fail to find the invasion necessary for trespass. In
such cases the complainer of the pollution often needs to urge strict
liability concepts separate from nuisance and trespass principles.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Waschak v. Moffat Coal
Company7" distinguished three theories for allowing recovery against
one from whose property material has escaped without negligence or
fault and caused damage to another. The court stated:
From the multitude of cases there appear to have been

promulgated three rules of law where there has been an invasion
of interests in the private use of land. They arise most frequently
where, without negligence or fault, material escapes to land of
another causing damage. The rules may be thus stated:

(1) The English rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330
(a leading case which is frequently cited)
(2) Absolute Nuisance Doctrine
(3) Restatement Rules.74
?IPRossER § 13. Prosser, however, points out that this concept has been repudiated
in England and is losing favor in the United States. Id.
72 In the nuisance field, the concept of liability without fault has gained wide
acceptance because of the prevailing theory that if a nuisance exists there is no
necessity to prove negligence on the part of the defendant. See, e.g., E. Rauh & Sons
Fertilzer Co. v. Shreffler, 139 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1943). This is based on the assertion
that the creation of the nuisance is, in itself, the intentional act upon which liability
is based. Id. But see Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash.
1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957) (reasonableness test applied). The primary problem involved in the nuisance raea is proving
an actionable nuisance to the court. See Waschak v. Moffat Coal Co., 379 Pa. 441,
109 A.2d 310 (1954). Whether there is an actionable nuisance depends on the surrounding circumstances of the case, such as the nature and reasonableness of the
defendant's use of his property, Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., supra at 488, the
extent of the injury, see, e.g., DeBlois v. Bowers, 44 F.2d 621, 623 (D. Mass. 1930), the
location of the property, see, e.g., Kelley v. National Lead Co., 240 Mo. App. 47, 60,
210 S.W.2d 728, 735 (1948), and the probable effect of the defendant's activities upon
the surrounding environment, see, e.g., id. In other words, a balancing of the equities
concept is frequently applied to determine the presence of an actionable nuisance, and
absolute nuisance is a label which is very rarely applied. See, e.g., id.
73 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310 (1954).
71Id. at 445-46, 109 A.2d at 313. Absolute liability, that is, liability irrespective of
negligence on the part of the defendant, may be rested upon any one or more of the
following theories: (1) the theory of nuisance, often called "absolute nuisance," see
notes 8-34 supra and accompanying text; (2) the theory, closely connected with the
theory of nuisance, that every person should so use his own property as not to injure
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The court in Waschak adopted the Restatement rule and agreed
that its adoption "will obviate the difficulty and confusion in attempting to reconcile or distinguish the great mass of cases."Ir6 Under
section 822 of the Restatement of Torts:
The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land if,
(a) The other has property rights and privileges in respect to
the use or enjoyment interfered with; and
(b) the invasion is substantial; and
(c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
(d) the invasion is either
(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the
rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous
76

conduct.

Applying this rule, the court reversed a verdict for plaintiff who had
sued for damages in trespass for injury to the paint on his house
which the jury found to have been sustained by the emission of hy7
drogen sulfide gas from defendant's coal culm banks.
The majority of the court reasoned that section 822 of the
Restatement "encompasses the entire statement of principles of
liability .... "78 Since defendant's conduct was neither intentional
nor ultrahazardous, there could be no liability. The court left virtually undiscussed the ultrahazardous conduct aspect of the case except
by seemingly equating it with "absolute nuisance" concepts.
The finding in Waschak that strict liability and absolute nuisance were co-extensive and that the nuisance must be shown to exist
that of another ("sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas', see, e.g., Morgan v. High
Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 193, 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 (1953); (3) the theory that one engaged in ultrahazardous activities is liable to another whose person or property is injured by such activities, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent harm, see
notes 81-86 infra and accompanying text; (4) the closely related doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher, see notes 79-80 infra and accompanying text and note 58 supra; (5) the
Restatement rule, which represents a combination of the theories mentioned above, see
notes 82-83 infra and accompanying text; and (6) the theory of trespass, see notes 3569 supra and accompanying text.
75 379 Pa. at 449, 109 A.2d at 314.
76RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939).
7 The court ignored the trespass aspects of the case except for mentioning that
it was an action in trespass, and analyzed the case solely in nuisance and strict liability
terms.
's379 Pa. at 454, 109 A.2d at 317.
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by the plaintiff before the doctrine of strict liability will be applied
would appear to be the prevailing view in those jurisdictions which
have analyzed the question of liability without fault. Therefore,
under the cover of "absolute nuisance" the Rylands v. Fletcher7 9
concept of strict liability has gained acceptance in the majority of
American jurisdictions.80
In actions which arise from personal injury to the plaintiff, the
doctrine of ultrahazardous activity, as expounded in cases which
have extended Rylands v. Fletcher, has been infrequently used
with success in the air pollution field. It has been accepted in one
case and rejected in another involving the emission of gases which
resulted in injury to the plaintiff. Lutheringer v. Moores1 accepted
82
the definition found in section 520 of the Restatement of Torts:
"An activity is ultra-hazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of
serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot
be eliminated by the exercise of utmost care, and (b) is not a matter
In this case, damages were allowed, without
of common usage."' '
proof of negligence on the part of the defendant, for injuries arising
from the escape of hydrocyanic acid gas used by defendant in a
fumigation process. The gas, however, was stated by statute to be
a "dangerous or lethal chemical," and this was emphasized in the
opinion.8 4
In a contrary case, Fritz v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company, 5
injuries were sustained by the plaintiff, an employee, from chlorine
gas and fumes which escaped in a manner unknown to the defendant. The court found that the use of chlorine gas was not so unusual or hazardous that the defendant should have foreseen the risk
of injury and have become liable as an insurer in case of injury. In
other words, the court drastically narrowed the concept of ultrahazardous activities, stating that to so restrict a corporation in the
use of dangerous substances would be non-utilitarian in nature, and
therefore the plaintiff must prove: (1) either an actionable nuisance
and thus avoid the problem of showing negligence, or (2) be pre79 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
80See PROSSER § 77.
8131 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
82 RFSTATENiENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
81131 Cal. 2d at 498, 190 P.2d at 7.
84 Id. at 497, 190 P.2d at 6.
8 45 Del. 427, 75 A.2d 256 (1950).
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pared to resort to the established theories of res ipsa loquitur and
the special control of the defendant over the evidence.
The paucity of authority makes prediction difficult, but it would
seem that the complainer of pollution will have formidable odds
against recovery unless in addition to strict liability-ultrahazardous
activity-he can talk nuisance, trespass, and perhaps res ipsa loquitur
as well.80 Certainly the successful cases are likely to be so sparse
as to have negligible pollution control consequences.
An extension of the concept of strict liability is found in the
development of the statutory liability of employers under state and
federal workmen's compensation acts. Since injuries to workers
caused by air pollution may come within the purview of the acts,
this is another cause of action on which one injured by air pollution
may proceed. The trend of decisions appears to be toward abandoning the original "accident" orientation of the acts and toward
extending their coverage to all areas of job-related disease. Although
this will doubtless allow many injured by pollution to recover who
could not do so on pure negligence, nuisance, and trespass theories,
the pollution control consequences will again be slight. In fact,
since some employees who would have a cause of action without such
a statute may now find their statutory remedy exclusive, the polluter
may find his pollution cheaper since at least part of his damage
is paid for on an insurance principle and the risk of high jury verdicts is avoided.8 7
86Prosser concludes that the American decisions, like the English ones, have applied
the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, and its extension to ultrahazardous activities
and absolute nuisance, only to things out of the ordinary-the abnormally dangerous

condition or activity which is not a "natural use."

PROSSER

§77. Euclid v. Ambler

Realty Co., 272 U.S. 865, 888 (1926), speaks of nuisance as "merely a right thing in

the wrong place--like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."
8Although the statutes tend to be comprehensive in coverage, an area which may
still present a field of continuing litigation concerns a type of job-related injury
to which workmen's compensation may not extend. It is to be noted that most
statutes cover accidents, a term which may not include within its scope diseases which
may be cumulative in nature and which are caused by air pollution sources such as

gaseous emissions in a plant. In such a case it is assumed that the worker would be left
to his common law remedy. See Triff v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co.,

185 Ohio St. 191, 20 N.E.2d 232 (1939). If the statutes were extended by interpretation to cover attritional diseases, the statutory compensation would be the sole
measure of relief and any common law remedy would be barred to the extent that

the statute was applicable.

PROSSER § 82.

Since the statutory remedy is exclusive,

e.g., Cell v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 281 Mich. 564, 275 N.W. 250 (1937); delBusto v.
E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 167 Misc. 920, 5 N.Y.S.2d 174 (Sup. Ct. 1938), afI'd per
curiam, 259 App. Div. 1070, 21 N.Y.S.2d 417, appeal denied, 284 N.Y. 817, 29 N.E.2d
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EFFECT OF POLLUTION CONTROL LEGISLATION

With the rapid increase of statutes and ordinances relating to
pollution control, the question has already arisen as to the effect of
such legislation on private rights.
In the Renken case,88 the defendant contended that the Oregon
air pollution control law preempted the field and foreclosed a private action.8 9 The court stated:
Defendant's contention that the Oregon Air Pollution Law
pre-empts this field is without foundation. Specifically recognized
by ORS 449.820 is the right by an individual to prosecute a suit
to abate a private or public nuisance. The record in this case is
sufficiently broad to be viewed as a suit to abate a nuisance, as well
as a suit to enjoin a continuing trespass. For that matter, a continuing trespass could well be a nuisance. The York cases recognize that the deposit of smoke screenings and particulates on the
lands of another amounts to a nuisance. The rule of construction
'expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' for which defendant contends, is not a rule of law, but is a mere guide in determining
intent and such a rule must be harmonized with all other rules
of construction. It is a rule which should be applied with caution
and merely as an auxiliary rule to determine the legislative intention.
...Thus, it is seen, that the common ordinary definition of
nuisance includes the continued or repeated invasion or disturbance of a right, such as a continuing trespass. Surely, the
Oregon Legislature employed the word in that sense when enacting ORS 449.820. Furthermore, all statutes which encroach
on personal or property rights of an individual are to be construed .strictly, and in the absence of express words or necessary
implication, it will be presumed that such statute is not intended
to interfere with or prejudice a private right or title ....
975 (1940). However, there are also a number of cases holding that the statutory remedy
is not exclusive where the injury or disease is not compensable under the act. E.g.,
Boal v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 98 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1938); Mapes v. Massey-Harris
Co., 19 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.Y. 1937); Kane v. Federal Match Corp., 5 F. Supp. 507
(M.D. Pa. 1934). For a state case which overruled an earlier decision and allowed a suit
at common law when the injury was uncompensated by the statute see Triff v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., supra.
88226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963).
89 ORE. Rav. STAT. § 449.820 (1965) provides, in part: "The provisions of this
section shall not prevent the maintenance of actions or suits relating to private or
public nuisances brought by any other person, or by the state on relation of any
person without prior order of the Sanitary Engineer."
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We must assume that the Oregon Legislature was familiar
with this rule of construction and that it never intended, by this
legislation, to deprive individuals, such as plaintiffs, of their
common law right to enjoin a flagrant violation of those rights
nor to pursue their right to enjoin a continuing trespass in a
proper Court. 90
Since no argument has been advanced that the assertion of private rights interferes with public control, it seems clearly desirable
to preserve private rights on the passage of control statutes and
ordinances. Given this conclusion the problem is really one of drafting legislation so as to preserve private rights.9 1
CONCLUSION

What the would-be private pollution controller finds, whether he
proceeds in nuisance, trespass, or damages for negligence, is that his

claim of right to pollution-free air will be subjected, along with the
polluter's claim of right, to a balancing of the equities in which the
court will attempt to measure benefits and costs to each, and, hopefully, to society as well. The plaintiff's success depends upon how
much importance those who make, apply, and interpret the law
attach to control of pollution as well as the technological capability
and cost of controlling it.
90226 F. Supp. at 175-76. In certain areas of federal legislation, the statutory
remedy is expressly exclusive in nature. See Federal Tort Claims Act § 423, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679 (1964). Whether federal legislation extends to concepts of strict liability is still
open to question. In Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44 (1952) (emphasis
added), it was stated that the Federal Tort Claims Act "is to be invoked only on a
'negligent or wrongful act or omission' of an employee." But the court in Wildwood
Mink Ranch v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 67, 69 (D. Minn. 1963), stated that the
correct interpretation of the earlier holding was "that the mere fact that absolute
liability under State law may be imposed against individuals for certain dangerous
activities does not relieve the Government from liability under the Tort Claims Act
where the misfeasance thereby required is established." The court found that the
negligent actions of Navy pilots in flying too low over the plaintiff's mink ranch
rendered the United States answerable in damages for the unforeseen consequences
caused by the noise to the plaintiff's minks, citing Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372
U.S. 108 (1963). The consequences of such a decision under § 410 (a) of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964), which makes the United States liable under
the local law of the place where the tort occurs for the negligent or wrongful acts or
omissions of federal employees within the scope of their employment, "in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances," has
yet to be tested as far as an extension from "noise" pollution to other types of pollution.
91A statement in the act or ordinance that none of its provisions is intended to
diminish any private rights of control or recovery existing prior to its passage would
seem desirable.
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indicate, once the necesand
As
sity of air pollution control, even at large cost, is ingrained in those
who apply the law, so-called equities will be balanced in favor of
the plaintiff seeking to assert his right to nonpolluted air, or to
recover the damages he suffers from polluted air. It is submitted,
therefore, that our legal concepts of nuisance, trespass, and negligence provide a suitable legal framework whereby private individuals
may obtain redress for damages caused by air pollution.
However, since any control through assertion of private rights
depends on the willingness and financial ability of individuals to go
to court, and, since the control consequences of private actions are
at best piecemeal, our population would doubtless suffocate before
the problem was sufficiently alleviated by private control. From
the standpoint of society as a whole, therefore, the most that can be
expected from air pollution control through assertion of private
rights is the handling of some instances of air pollution which cannot be or are not yet controlled by public regulation.
02 Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 918 (1960).
"Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Ore. 1959).
9 Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963).

